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Abstract 
Purpose - This paper investigates the impact of insider trading on subsequent stock returns in 
the UK, with a specific focus on the impact of the global financial crisis of 2007-08 on the 
relation between CEO and CFO stock purchases and returns. 
Design/methodology/approach - The empirical analysis uses 10,230 purchases executed in 
679 UK firms by 1,477 directors during the period from 2000 to 2010. Subsequent market-
adjusted stock returns are regressed on a set of firm-specific accounting, market and 
corporate governance variables as well as the characteristics of CEOs and CFOs. 
Additionally, the analysis distinguishes between the opportunistic and routine trades.  
Findings – The findings reveal that the position of the trading director and the nature of their 
trades are important in determining the impact on returns of insider trades. In particular, CEO 
purchases are on the whole more informative than CFO purchases and opportunistic 
purchases. The trades in the post-crisis period have a greater impact on subsequent stock 
returns.  
Research limitations/implications – The empirical analysis is limited to the trades made by 
two executives. Future research should consider inside trades by all directors and distinguish 
between executive and non-executive directors. Also, a behavioral measure should be 
developed to test if the financial crisis affected the trading behavior of directors and whether 
directors use insider trading strategically to signal information to the market. 
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Practical implications – The impact of directors’ dealings on stock returns is not 
homogeneous. Financial analysts and investors should pay more attention to different types 
of trades and the identity of trading director. 
Originality/value - This paper, to our knowledge, provides the first attempt that combines in 
the same framework the identity and personal attributes of trading executive directors, firm-
level corporate governance features, the nature of purchase transactions, and the trading 
period characteristics. Furthermore the empirical analysis is carried out during a period that 
also covers the recent global financial crisis period and its immediate aftermath.  
Keywords  CEO, CFO, insider trading, opportunistic and routine purchases, stock returns, 
financial crisis. 
Paper type  Research paper 
JEL classification: G30, G32, G39 
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1. Introduction  
This paper investigates the relationship between open market purchases made by CEOs 
and CFOs and subsequent stock returns. Prior studies of insider trading show that corporate 
insiders earn abnormal returns on their trades, which is taken as evidence that insiders have 
superior information about a firm’s future performance. In these studies, insider trading is 
recognized as an important source of information and outsiders expect insider transactions to 
be informative because company directors, in particular the executives, are better informed 
about the operating and financing characteristics of their firms (Hoque and Lasfer, 2013; 
Jiang and Zaman, 2010; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; and Seyhun, 1986). Early research on 
insider trading considers the short-term market reaction and provides evidence of abnormal 
returns on aggregate insider trading in the months following directors’ dealings (Finnerty, 
1976; Jaffe, 1974; Seyhun, 1988; and Sylvain et al., 2002). This earlier strand of the literature 
was followed by extensive research that focuses on the long-term profitability of insider 
trading. This research reports strong evidence on the abnormal returns outsiders can achieve 
by replicating the trades of insiders, suggesting that the predictive power of insider trades 
regarding the future market returns is high (Brochet, 2010; Gregory et al., 2013; and 
Lakonishok and Lee, 2001)2. 
More recently, it is argued that the subsequent returns to trades by insiders may also 
depend on the position directors hold within the firm. For example, in a study of US 
companies, focusing on the trades made by CEOs and CFOs, Wang et al. (2012) provide 
                                                          
2 There is also evidence that insiders trade on the basis of their contrarian beliefs, buying (selling) 
undervalued (overvalued) shares in an attempt to take advantage of any perceived misvaluation (Jiang 
and Zaman, 2010; Piotroski and Roulstone, 2005; and Rozeff and Zaman, 1998). 
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strong evidence that CFOs earn significantly greater returns from their purchases of company 
shares than CEOs. They argue that trades of CFOs reveal more information about future 
stock returns. Also, Ravina and Sapienza (2010) examine the impact of purchase transactions 
made by independent company directors. They find that positive abnormal returns that 
independent directors earn when they purchase shares in their companies are not significantly 
different from those earned by executive directors. Fidrmuc et al. (2006) also report positive 
abnormal returns on insider purchases for UK firms. However, they find that the market’s 
positive reaction to the trades made by CEOs is lower than it is for other directors. 
In a similar vein to Wang et al. (2012) we investigate the informative content of trades 
made by CEOs and CFOs by examining the impact of their open market purchases on stock 
returns. In doing so, we note that the two executive directors are the most informed directors 
about the issues relevant to firm value, while we assume that the ability to convey and trade 
on information vary between these two executives. Although the market tends to perceive 
their trades as a signal of superior information, the information content of their trades, and 
hence the impact on subsequent returns, are likely to differ. It is argued that, in comparison to 
CFOs, CEOs are higher in the corporate hierarchy and usually have superior insights into the 
firm’s affairs. Therefore, CEO insider transactions are potentially more informative than CFO 
trading (Lin and Howe, 1990; and Seyhun, 1986). However, it is also recognized that CFO 
trades may be more informative because CEOs are more closely scrutinized by the market 
and hence may be more reluctant to trade using their informational advantage over outsiders. 
In contrast, CFOs would be more willing to exploit their superior information by trading, 
which makes their transactions more strongly linked to future earnings and returns (Wang et 
al., 2012). 
There are two distinct features of the analysis provided in this paper. Firstly, we 
acknowledge that insider trading is not homogenous as to the timing of purchase transactions 
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made by the firm’s CEO and CFO. To this end, we consider two types of insider stock 
purchases, routine and opportunistic, classifying trades on the basis of the historical trading 
behavior of the trading insider.  Distinguishing between the two types of trades enables us to 
better focus on the informative content of insider purchases as opportunistic trades are more 
likely to be triggered by private information.  To the extent that opportunistic purchases are 
informed, we argue that they should be associated with greater subsequent market returns 
compared to routine purchases. Moreover, we do not rule out the possibility that the 
difference in the impact on returns of different types of purchases may also depend on 
whether the trading executive is the firm’s CEO or CFO. We therefore identify four groups of 
insider trades, namely CEO-opportunistic, CEO-routines, CFO-opportunistic, and CFO-
routine purchases, and provide insights into the purchase-return relation for each group. 
Secondly, we incorporate the view that the predictive power of insider trades is likely 
to vary over time with market-wide changes and macroeconomic shocks. We argue that the 
severity of asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders, and hence the impact of 
private information on returns, should be greater during the recent global financial crisis. To 
incorporate this view, we test whether the predicted relation between insider trading and 
market-adjusted returns changes between the normal times, captured by the trades during the 
period from 2000 to 2006, and the crisis period from 2007 to 2008. Additionally, we consider 
the period from 2009 to 2010 as the post-crisis period. 
Our sample consists of 10,230 open market purchases executed in 679 UK firms by 
1,477 top executives in the sample period (2000-2010). During this period CFOs (CEOs) 
make 5,450 (4,780) purchases. We also observe that the average value of opportunistic 
purchases is significantly greater than it is for routine purchases. This holds throughout the 
sample period.  Our detailed descriptive and regression analysis show that the subsequent 
market-adjusted returns to insider purchase transactions are generally positive. However, the 
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findings also reveal that the positive returns are much weaker in the longer term. This 
possibly suggests that the informative content of the purchases by CEOs and CFOs is less 
significant than the market’s perception of how informative they are. More importantly, our 
initial findings imply that there are no significant differences between opportunistic and 
routine trades. Nonetheless, the results change when we distinguish between opportunistic 
and routine trades made by both types of executives and carry out the analysis for different 
sub-periods. More specifically, the findings indicate that the opportunistic trades made by 
both CEOs and CFOs are more informative than the routine ones in the longer term, but only 
in the post-crisis period. We cannot provide any evidence supporting the view that 
opportunistic trades would be more informative during the crisis. If anything, the market 
reacts more positively to routine trades in the short term during this period, in particular to 
those made by CEOs. Moreover, the longer-term market-adjusted returns associated with 
CEO opportunistic trades are significantly lower. Overall, the strongest results on the positive 
impact of insider purchases on returns relates to CEO trades made in the post-crisis period. 
We also find that the market-adjusted returns seem to increase with the size of trade and 
decrease with greater external affiliations and the number of past trades. Among the corporate 
governance characteristics included in the analysis, board independence affects the returns 
positively during the crisis and negatively in the post-crisis period. The latter finding possibly 
suggests that board independence and insider purchases are substitutes in reducing the 
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders.  
This study extends the literature on the informative content of insider trading in 
several important ways. Firstly, the analysis of the paper provides a unique setting by 
unifying the recent analyses of Wang et al. (2012) and Cohen et al. (2012) in a framework 
that allows us to distinguish not only between CEO and CFO purchases but also opportunistic 
and routine trades. Also, differently from both studies, we incorporate in the empirical 
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analysis important managerial and corporate governance characteristics, which may impact 
the returns subsequent to director purchases. Including them in the analysis enables us to 
control for the potential role they may play as an additional channel of information and a tool 
to reduce the consequences of asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders. 
Secondly, the empirical analysis is carried out during a period that also covers the recent 
global financial crisis period and its immediate aftermath. Each prediction regarding the 
relation between open market purchases and subsequent returns is tested to see if the findings 
change with the experience of the recent financial crisis. Furthermore, to our knowledge, this 
paper provides the first attempt that combines in the same framework the identity and 
personal attributes of trading executive directors, firm-level corporate governance features, 
the nature of purchase transactions, and the trading period characteristics. Last but not least, 
our analysis makes a clear distinction between the immediate and gradual reaction to insider 
trading by considering both the short-term market reaction to insider trading and the long-
term informativeness of the trade carried by CEOs and CFOs. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we discuss the 
regulatory framework which sets out the rules with regard to directors’ dealings. Section 2 
outlines the regulations on directors’ dealings in the UK. Section 3 explains the main 
variables and provides a description of the data used in the analysis. In Section 4, we provide 
a descriptive analysis of the returns to insider trading. In Section 5, we discuss the regression 
results and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. The Regulatory Framework on Directors’ Dealings in the UK 
Dealing by directors is generally defined as buying and selling of securities and rights 
or obligations, including the grant and exercise of options and pledging shares as security for 
a loan. Open market purchases made by directors, which this study is concerned with, are 
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regulated indifferently from other types of directors’ deals. The regulatory framework 
regarding the dealings of directors in the UK is primarily contained in the Companies Act, 
which is the main legislation and source of company law in the UK. Under the law, directors 
are required to notify the company of any dealings in its shares as soon as possible and no 
later than on the fifth business day following the transaction. Companies must in turn notify 
the Company Announcements Office of the London Stock Exchange without delay and no 
later than the end of the business day following receipt of the information by the company.  
In addition, the Model Code on directors’ dealings, set out in Chapter 9 of the Listing 
Rules (LR9 Annex 1)3, provides further guidance for companies and directors in relation to 
directors’ dealings. For example, regarding the purpose of their dealings, the Code requires 
directors not to deal in any securities of the company on considerations of a short-term 
nature. Also, directors not must to deal during “close period” that is the period of two months 
preceding the announcement of the company’s annual or half-yearly results. Furthermore, 
directors must not deal at any time when they are in possession of unpublished price-sensitive 
information in relation to the security. Finally, directors are required not to trade without 
advising the designated director (usually the chairman) in advance and receiving clearance. 
3. Data  
Our primary data on insider trades are collected from the Morningstar UK database, 
which provides information on trade characteristics (i.e. type, size, date) and the identity of 
trading directors (i.e. name, role). The database also provides information on the equity 
ownership of insiders prior to their transactions. Additional information on the managerial 
and corporate governance characteristics is sourced from BoardEx. Using financial data 
                                                          
3 See http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/policy/listing_rules for an extensive analysis of the current and 
historic Listing Rules in the UK. 
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provided by Datastream (Thomson Reuters) we analyse stock returns for up to 90 days before 
and after each transaction. All the returns used in the regression analysis are market-adjusted, 
and the FTSE All-Share index is used for the adjustment. In line with the majority of earlier 
research, we base our analysis only on open purchases as they are more likely to represent 
actions taken as a result of private information. All other types of insider transactions (e.g., 
exercises of options, and private purchases and sales) are excluded.  
 Several sample selection criteria are applied. First, in line with previous research (e.g. 
Fidrmuc et al., 2006), transactions performed by directors of financial institutions are 
excluded. Second, small transactions with a value lower than £10 are excluded to avoid 
unnecessary noise in the estimation of returns. Furthermore, multiple purchases made by the 
insider on the same day are combined into a single data point, assuming that they are 
motivated by the same information.  
Table 1 presents the stages to derive the final sample of firms and directors used in the 
study. Our initial sample includes 19,298 open-market purchase transactions, of which 
10,548 (8,750) were made by CEOs (CFOs) during the sample period. In our final sample, 
we have 10,230 observations for purchase transactions in which there are 4,780 and 5,450 
purchases carried out by CEOs and CFOs respectively. Of these purchases, 2,930 transactions 
are recorded during the crisis period, compared to 2,843 purchases made in the post-crisis 
period. Furthermore, the final sample used in the empirical analysis provides us with 
transactions performed by 1,477 distinct executives from 679 different firms. In any sub-
periods, we have at least 406 firms and 656 executives to consider. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
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3.1.   Dependent variable: market adjusted returns 
In calculating the post-trading returns, which is the main variable of interest, we follow a 
similar procedure that is widely used in prior research (see, e.g., Brown and Warner, 1985; 
Kothari and Warner, 1997; and Ravina and Sapienza, 2010). Following each director-trading 
day we compute market-adjusted buy-and-hold-returns (MBAHR), inclusive of dividends, for 
up to 5, 10, 60, and 90 days. Specifically, we first estimate the abnormal return for firm i on 
day t as ARi,t = Ri,t – Rm,t, where Ri,t is the daily return for the traded share i on day t and Rm,t 
is the return on the value-weighted FTSE All-Share4 index on the same day. We then define 
various MBAHRs, namely  RET_5, RET_10, RET_60 and RET_90, by taking the difference 
between firm returns over the relevant window and returns on the value-weighted FTSE All-
Share index, where both returns are compounded over the same relevant period. Specifically, 
using daily return data we estimate  
 

T
t
T
t
tmtii RETRETMBHAR
1 1
,, )1()1( where T takes 
the value of 5, 10, 60, or 90 days.  
3.2.   Explanatory variables: managerial and corporate governance variables 
In our empirical analysis we focus on three groups of variables, namely trade and 
managerial characteristics, and the corporate governance attributes of firms. Furthermore, we 
control for several firm-specific variables including size, book-to-market and information on 
past returns. A full description of the variables is given in Appendix 1. 
                                                          
4 FTSE ALL-Share Index represents about 99 percent of UK market capitalization, aggregating of the 
FTSE 100, FTSE 250 and FTSE Small Cap Indices (http://www.ftse.com/Indices/UK_Indices). Each 
company in the Index is first weighted using the number of shares-in-issue and the share price. Then, 
the free float factor is incorporated to arrive at the final weight, considering only the shares available 
for trading and hence ignoring those shares held by restricted shareholders such as family owners.  
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Transaction characteristics. To differentiate between routine and opportunistic 
purchase trades, we classify the insider transaction as routine if an executive director trades in 
the same month over the past three consecutive years prior to the transaction that is 
considered. Otherwise, the trade is classified as opportunistic. We predict that the relation 
between opportunistically made trades and subsequent returns is positive. Also, the relation is 
expected to be stronger than that between routine trades and returns.  Additionally, we test if 
subsequent purchase returns are also impacted by the size of the trade transaction by 
incorporating in the analysis the natural logarithm of the value of purchase transactions. 
Obviously, the impact of larger purchases on subsequent returns is expected to be greater. 
Finally, the number of past trades made by the trading director prior to the purchase 
transaction date is considered. Although we do not have a clear-cut prediction, we postulate 
that the impact of purchases on returns is likely to get smaller when it is preceded by a greater 
number of trades by the same director as it is less likely to be based on significant 
informational advantage. 
Managerial characteristics. We consider four important characteristics of trading 
directors in the empirical analysis. First, we argue that managers with longer tenure in their 
firms are more likely to have superior knowledge about the firm’s prospects and the internal 
processes within the firm, leading them to have greater power and influence in the company. 
The impact of tenure on subsequent returns can be positive as tenure improves access to 
relevant information (Bebchuk et al., 2010). Nevertheless, it is also possible that the relation 
is negative as longer tenure is likely to lead to excessive managerial power, which can be 
perceived negatively by the market. Second, it is argued that greater equity ownership not 
only increases the ability of directors to influence firm decisions, but also provides them with 
more flexibility to trade (Denis et al., 1997; and Eckbo and Thorburn, 2003). We then expect 
that the informative content of director transactions increases with higher equity ownership. 
12 
 
However, as also discussed in (Fidrmuc et al., 2006), an increase in the equity ownership of 
directors would not significantly impact the informative content of purchase transactions if it 
is made by executives who already hold large stakes. Finally, we consider in the analysis the 
amount of time directors have before their retirement, which can potentially capture the 
experience and risk attitude of the trading director. 
Corporate governance characteristics. Corporate governance literature suggests 
several mechanisms that can limit the adverse effects of the information asymmetry between 
insiders and outsiders in the presence of costly agency incentives. In this paper we consider 
three corporate governance characteristics which may affect the informative content of 
insider trading, namely board size, board independence and institutional ownership 
concentration. A positive relation is expected between board size and the effective 
monitoring of executives as a greater number of board members is expected to increase both 
the quantity and quality of advice and expertise they provide firms with (Fitch and Slezak, 
2008). Acharya and Johnson (2010) analyze the impact of the number of insiders on the 
frequency of their trades and suggest that a greater number of insiders lead to more insider 
trading. Even if large boards are less effective in monitoring corporate financial decision-
making they are expected to be more effective in terms of decreasing the information gap 
between insiders and outsiders. Therefore, we expect board size to have a negative effect on 
the informative content of CEO and CFO trades.  
Another aspect of corporate governance that may influence the returns on insider 
trading relates to board independence. We argue that the monitoring of executive directors in 
firms with less independent boards is weaker. This in turn makes it more likely for executive 
directors to use private information and generate abnormal returns. Accordingly, a negative 
relation is expected between the returns from director trades and board independence. 
However, non-executive directors may choose to play a less confrontational role as they lack 
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sufficient incentives to provide an effective monitoring of executives. Furthermore, the 
reduced ability of corporate governance codes to enforce the duties of directors may cause 
non-executive directors to be less active. To the extent that this happens, the impact of non-
executives on the returns from insider trading can be weaker or insignificant. 
The last corporate governance attribute we consider is the institutional ownership 
concentration. Large investors have greater voting power as well as more incentives to 
monitor management, promoting good corporate governance (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; 
and Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Also, institutional investors are better than other investors at 
collecting and processing information. Although they may also trade on the basis of noise, 
they are expected to make their decisions based on relevant and superior information (e.g. Ke 
and Petroni, 2004; and Yan and Zhang, 2009). Therefore, in the presence of large 
shareholders the degree of information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders is likely to 
be reduced, resulting in a lower predictive power of the insider trading and smaller 
profitability. 
 Other firm-specific control variables. In our analysis, we also control for firm-
specific characteristics including size, growth opportunities, industry and past returns, which 
can influence stock returns irrespective of the identity of the trader. To this end, based on 
previous research, which shows that managers may exhibit contrarian behavior (Lakonishok 
and Lee, 2001; and Rozeff and Zaman, 1998), we expect a negative relation between the past 
returns and the subsequent returns on purchase transactions. Additionally, similar to earlier 
studies, we expect an inverse relation between firm size and the profitability of insider 
trading (Jeng et al., 2003; and Seyhun, 1986) as the scrutiny of investors in larger firms is 
much greater and in smaller firms the ability of top executives to access valuable information 
is greater, which in turn reduces the informational advantage of executives. The next control 
variable used in the study is book-to-market ratio, which is a proxy for the firm’s growth 
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opportunities, and is generally taken as a predictor of future stock returns (Baker et al., 2003). 
It is expected that the book-to-market ratio will exert a positive impact on returns from 
insider trading by executives. 
4. Descriptive and Univariate Analysis  
In presenting our descriptive statistics and the results, we consider three sub-periods, as 
well as reporting results for the whole sample period of 2000 to 2010. The three sub-periods 
are as follows: 2000-2006 (pre-crisis); 2007-2008 (crisis); and 2009-2010 (post-crisis).  
4.1.  Descriptive analysis of independent variables 
Table 2 provides summary statistics of the variables that are used in the subsequent 
empirical analysis. We report these statistics by grouping them into firm, corporate 
governance, managerial, and transaction characteristics. The average (median) book-to-
market value during the whole sample period is 0.60 (0.46).  However, as would be expected, 
there are significant differences across different sub-periods. The mean book-to-market value 
during the crisis drops to 0.46 whereas in the post-crisis it increases to 0.86, possibly 
suggesting that there are more value firms during the period following the crisis. The average 
board size for the total sample is 7.7 and remains similar in the three sub-periods. The 
average firm has 55 percent of their board members as non-executive directors. Notably, the 
ratio of the number of non-executive directors to total board size increases from 53 percent in 
the pre-crisis period to 58 percent after the crisis. The concentration of institutional 
ownership, Inst_Own_Cont, is relatively stable across the sub-periods with an average value 
of 22.59 percent in the pre-crisis period and 27.66 and 26.96 percent in the crisis and post-
crisis periods respectively. The average (median) concentration for the whole sample is 25.12 
(23.15) percent.  
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[Insert Table 2 here] 
Moving on to directors’ characteristics, we observe that the average holdings of both 
CEOs and CFOs increase over time. Specifically, the mean value of CEO (CFO) holdings 
increases to 2.28 (0.39) percent in the post-crisis period from 1.72 (0.33) percent observed in 
the pre-crisis period. The findings suggest that on average CEOs have a longer tenure than 
CFOs in their current firm at the time of their trading. The average tenure for a CEO (CFO) 
during the sample period is just over 6 (5) years. Furthermore, CEOs are relatively closer to 
retirement than CFOs, who have on average 2.5 more years than CEOs to retire at the time of 
their trades. The average number of external affiliations of the trading directors also differs 
significantly. On average, 21 percent of the CEOs in the sample are linked to another firm as 
a director, whereas the mean percentage value for the CFOs is only 12. More interestingly, 
the external affiliations of both director groups decrease during the crisis compared to the 
pre-crisis period, from 24 (14) for the CEOs (CFOs) to 18 (9) percent. Although the ratio 
remains unchanged for the CEOs during the post-crisis period, it increases for the CFOs, to a 
level that is even higher than its pre-crisis value. The average number of times CEOs and 
CFOs trade, Past_Trades, during the sample period are 7.5 and 9.5 respectively. The 
frequency of CFO trading is consistently greater than that of CEO trading in all periods. In 
line with the findings of previous research (Cohen et al., 2012), there are more opportunistic 
purchases for both executives in all periods. However, while the percentage of opportunistic 
trades is 68 and 67 percent respectively in the pre-crisis and the crisis periods, it drops to 54 
percent during the period following the crisis. This holds for both CEOs (52 percent) and 
CFOs (55 percent). It is likely that the number of profit-making opportunities during the 
crisis remains high due to lower market prices and possibly undervalued assets, which may 
partially explain why the percentage of opportunistic trades remains almost unchanged during 
this period. Similarly, once the market has corrected itself in the subsequent period, the sharp 
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drop in the ratio of opportunistic to total trades may indicate either the unwillingness of 
directors to use private information in trading or a lack of relevant private information. We 
explore these possibilities later in the paper.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
In Table 3, we provide further information on the purchase transactions that are made 
by both types of directors in both types of trade. There are several observations that arise 
from the analysis of the results. First, the value of the average opportunistic trade during the 
whole sample is much greater, at about £46K, than the average routine trade, which is about 
£11K. The significant difference holds across all sub-periods, where it is the largest during 
the post-crisis period with the mean value of the routine trades (about £9.9K) being less than 
15 percent of that of opportunistic ones (about £68.8K). Second, comparing the value of the 
purchase transactions across different periods, we observe that the mean value of transactions 
increases from £24.7K in the pre-crisis period to £38.7K during the crisis and continues to 
increase to £41.5K in the post-crisis period. This is despite the fact that the number of 
purchase transactions drops sharply during the same period from 4,457 in the pre-crisis 
period to 2,843 in the post-crisis period (see Panel B). Furthermore, while the average value 
of the opportunistic trade increases by about 127 percent from £30.4K in the pre-crisis period 
to £68.8K in the post-crisis period, the average routine trade value decreases by about 23 
percent during the same period, from £12.8K to 9.9K. Interestingly, this does not hold for the 
CEO routine trades, whose value increases first sharply during the crisis period, from £10.9K 
to £15.3K, and then drops again to £11.9K, which is still above the pre-crisis level. The only 
mean trade value which drops below the corresponding average level of the pre-crisis period 
is that of the CFO routine trade in which the values are about £14K and £7.9K respectively, 
representing a drop of about 44 percent. Overall, we conclude that while the volume of 
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purchase trades increases during the sample period the observed increase seems to result from 
the significant rise in the mean transaction value of opportunistic trades rather than an 
increase in the number of transactions.  
4.2.  Descriptive analysis of returns 
In Table 4 we provide an analysis of adjusted returns by focusing on the differences in 
returns on the CEO and CFO trades. In doing so, we attempt to see whether the crisis period 
of 2007 and 2008 makes any difference in the impact of insider trades on the subsequent  
stock returns. In general, the findings suggest that the opportunistic CEO trades generate 
greater adjusted returns regardless of the sub-period.5 When we differentiate between the 
returns in different periods, we note that the return on routine CEO trades is always positive 
and greater than that on CFO trades in the crisis period. Furthermore, the returns on CFO 
trades during the same period are mostly negative. Also, we note that the longer-term routine 
CEO trade returns (RET_60 and RET_90) are higher than the corresponding opportunistic 
CEO trades in the crisis period.  
Moving on to the return during the post-crisis period, all adjusted opportunistic returns 
are greater than the corresponding ones in the crisis period. Similarly, the returns on routine 
CFO trades in the post-crisis period are greater except for RET_5. However, the observed 
returns on routine CEO trades drop significantly in this period and the shorter-term returns, 
RET_5 and RET_10, turn negative. 
[Insert Tables 4 here] 
                                                          
5 The only exception relates to the returns for RET_60 in the pre-crisis period in which the mean value 
of CEO opportunistic trades (2.86 percent) is lower than it is for the CFOs (3.18 percent). 
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5. Regression Results  
5.1.  The determinants of returns – baseline model 
In Table 5 we report the findings for our baseline model in which the regression results 
are obtained using the whole sample period. We distinguish between different sub-periods by 
incorporating period time dummies in the analysis, Crisis and Post-crisis. In addition to other 
executive director characteristics, we also include dummy variables to test the impact of 
different types of trade on the observed adjusted returns. Specifically, we examine whether 
the subsequent returns to opportunistic and routine trades by CEOs and opportunistic trades 
by CFOs are significantly different from the returns following routine trades by CFOs. 
Accordingly, the CFO routine trades that are made in the pre-crisis period serve as the 
baseline category in the model, captured by the constant term. The regression results relate to 
four types of return. The first two, RET_5 and RET_10, capture the short-term cumulative 
market-adjusted returns from insider trading, whereas RET_60 and RET_90 are included to 
reflect the long-term impact of the trades made by directors.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Turning to the results, we find that the trades by both CEOs and CFOs lead to positive 
market-adjusted returns in the short term. Specifically, the 5-day and 10-day returns on CFO 
routine purchases in the pre-crisis period, captured by the constant term, are positive and 
significant at the 1% level. The estimated coefficients for the other sub-groups of trades, 
namely CEO_Opportunistic, CEO_Routine and CFO_Opportunistic, are not statistically 
different from those estimated for the CFO_Routine dummy. The findings suggest that the 
market perceives inside purchases as informative about the future prospects of the company 
and reacts accordingly in the early subsequent days regardless of the type of trade and 
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executive director. However, there is no significant relation between inside purchases and the 
returns in 60 and 90 days. These results remain unchanged when we change the baseline 
category to capture, for example, the CEO opportunistic trades in the pre-crisis period. 
Although the different types of purchases do not reveal significant differences, 
transaction size (Trade_Size) and the number of previous trades (Past_Trade) by directors 
affect the adjusted returns, albeit differently. All market-adjusted returns are significantly 
greater for larger transactions, suggesting that the size of purchases made by directors 
impacts the market’s perception of how significant inside purchases are,  supported by the 
results in relation to RET_5 and RET_10, and how informative they are, supported by the 
results in relation to RET_60 and RET_90.   However, the number of previous trades does 
not seem to increase the informativeness of purchases. The greater the number of purchases 
made by directors, the lower the return they lead to in the short term, while the impact is 
insignificant in the longer term. Similarly, we find mixed results in relation to the director 
characteristics. The holdings of directors prior to the transaction do not affect the subsequent 
returns. On the other hand, the amount of time they sit on the board, Tenure, has a significant 
impact only on the return in 5 days and the impact is negative. It has no bearing on longer 
subsequent returns. Additionally, the longer the time to retirement, the lower the effect we 
observe on subsequent returns, and the relation is significant only for 5-day returns. This is 
not in line with what we would normally expect to hold. The only director characteristic that 
seems to be relevant in the medium term relates to their outside experience. The adjusted 
returns on the trades made by directors who have external affiliations are lower, reflected in 
the negative and significant estimated coefficients for 60- and 90-day returns. 
Purchases in value firms with higher book-to-market ratios lead to positive and significant 
returns both in the short term and in the long term. It seems that executive directors have 
superior information about the market value of their companies supported, by the stronger 
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results (both economically and significantly) with regard to long-term returns. The findings 
for firm size are, however, mixed. Although the adjusted returns are insignificant in the short 
term, purchases in larger firms seem to be informative in the longer term. 
Although we do not test directly the hypothesis that the behavior of directors is 
contrarian, we provide some evidence that there is a relation between the short-term returns 
on director purchases and the returns observed prior to their trades. Purchases made by 
directors following higher past 30- and 90-day returns lead to negative adjusted returns in the 
short term with no significant impact in the long term. Similarly, those purchases following 
negative recent returns lead to gains above the market return in the short term.  
Turning to the findings on the relation between corporate governance characteristics and 
the market-adjusted returns, we find that board characteristics and institutional ownership 
play a limited role in determining the subsequent returns. Purchases by directors sitting on 
larger boards lead to smaller-than-the-market returns in 5 days with no significant impact on 
other returns. Moreover, board independence does not impact the adjusted returns except in 
the long term and only for 90-day returns. Purchases by directors in firms with more 
independent boards are associated with negative adjusted returns in the long term. To the 
extent that board independence is a desirable and effective corporate governance feature, the 
executive directors have limited or no ability to access private (superior) information in 
companies with more independent directors and any attempts to gain from trading in those 
companies do not pay off. Similarly, purchases in the companies with greater concentration 
of institutional ownership lead to negative adjusted returns in the short term and no 
significant gains or losses in the long term. 
Finally, in line with our earlier descriptive results, the adjusted returns associated with 
purchases during the crisis are significantly lower than in the pre-crisis period. However, the 
post-crisis and the pre-crisis period returns are similar except for the average 90-day adjusted 
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return. During the post-crisis period, purchases made by directors are associated with lower 
market-adjusted returns in the long term compared to the pre-crisis period. 
5.2.  The determinants of returns in the sub-periods 
Although the above analysis controls for the possibility that adjusted returns differ across 
different periods, it does not allow the impact of the determinants of adjusted returns to 
change between the periods. In Table 6 we estimate the same model for three different sub-
periods to test this possibility.6  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
The results for the pre-crisis period are overall similar to those provided for the baseline 
model in Table 5. More specifically, the adjusted returns subsequent to purchase transactions 
are positive and significant in the short term and purchases do not seem to be informative in 
the long term. Whether trades are opportunistic or routine and made by CEOs or CFOs does 
not seem to matter. One noticeable change in the results, however, is that the estimated 
impact of transaction size is positive and significant for all returns both in the short term and 
in the long term during the pre-crisis period. That is, the market reacts positively to larger 
purchases and they seem to be informative. 
The results regarding the crisis period reveal that the routine purchases made by CEOs are 
more informative than all other purchase transactions. The estimated coefficient of 
CEO_Routine is positive and significant only for 90-day returns. The findings reveal that the 
CEO routine purchases yield a market-adjusted return in 90 days which is 2.71 percent more 
                                                          
6 We focus on director, trade and corporate governance characteristics and hence do not report in the following 
tables the findings in relation to firm-specific characteristics and the past returns for brevity. However, the 
results are available upon request. 
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than the routine purchases made by CFOs. There is some evidence that opportunistic trades 
are neither well received by the market in the short term nor informative in the long term 
during the crisis. Although the results are insignificant, the estimated coefficients associated 
with opportunistic trades are negative regardless of the return and the executive. Also, in the 
crisis period the importance of transaction size and the number of previous trades are reduced 
substantially. In addition, we find that the time directors spend on the board affects the 
adjusted returns in the long term negatively. The negative and significant results regarding 
the variable which is proxy for the board experience of directors are more difficult to explain 
for the long-term adjusted returns. In contrast to the pre-crisis period, when purchases are 
made by directors who have other board experience the adjusted returns for all types are 
insignificant, reflected in the estimated coefficient of the variable Affiliations. However, the 
amount of time directors have to retire exerts a significant effect for returns both in the short 
term and the long term. The longer the amount of time to retire the less likely that the inside 
purchase is informative. To the extent that this variable also captures the experience and age 
of directors, the findings are in line with the view that more experienced directors are more 
likely to access private information and use it in trading. Finally, our results suggest that the 
influence of corporate governance characteristics of firms on the adjusted returns changes 
during the crisis period. What seems to matter most as a governance mechanism is the degree 
of board independence. The findings reveal that inside purchases by directors of firms with 
relatively more independent directors are likely to be more informative in the long term. The 
positive relation between board independence and adjusted returns is at odds with the view 
that the likelihood of directors having private information and using it in their trading is 
lower in a good corporate governance environment. Accordingly, board independence should 
not lead to positive market-adjusted returns subsequent to director transactions. As for the 
effect of institutional ownership on adjusted returns during the crisis, we find that the 
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negative effect, albeit moderate, that we observe in the pre-crisis period recedes largely in the 
crisis years. 
Finally, in Table 6 we present the regression results in the post-crisis period, which 
provide us with stronger results than the findings reported for the earlier periods. First, it is 
clear that the opportunistic purchases made by CEOs and CFOs generally lead to greater 
returns in the long term. Also, the market reacts positively to inside trades in the short term as 
evidenced by the significant constant term for RET_5. The findings imply that the market-
adjusted returns on routine trades made by CFOs are positive, albeit significant only for 
RET_5, and the returns on other types of trade are not significantly different. This provides 
some evidence on the relevance of inside trades at least in the short term. However, findings 
regarding the informativeness of purchases in the long term are unambiguous. The 
cumulative adjusted returns on the opportunistic trades by both CEOs and CFOs after 
transactions over 60 and 90 days are significantly higher. More importantly, the CEO 
opportunistic trades in the post-crisis period yield greater returns than those made by CFOs. 
Specifically, the adjusted returns from CEO (CFO) opportunistic trades in 60 and 90 days are 
respectively about 4.25 and 6.63 (3.62 and 4.98) percent greater than the return on CFO 
routine trades. The difference between CEO and CFO returns during these subsequent trading 
days is 0.63 percent in 60 days and 1.65 percent in 90 trading days. Overall, the findings are 
strongly in favor of the opportunistic trades by both directors for their ability to convey 
relevant information to the market, with some evidence that CEO opportunistic trades are 
more effective in doing so.  
Another important finding in Table 6 relates to the impact of board independence. 
Contrary to the positive effect it has on returns during the crisis period, the role of board 
independence in determining the returns associated with purchase transactions in the post-
crisis period seems to have changed substantially. There is strong evidence that the returns 
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are significantly lower in firms in which board independence is stronger. This implies that 
board independence is an effective mechanism in mitigating the asymmetric information 
between insiders and outsiders, which renders the trades by insiders much less informative. 
That is, it substitutes the role played by insider trading in conveying private information, 
suggesting that directors can neither signal private information to outsiders nor profit from 
their trades. 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
Insider trading has received considerable attention in the literature because insiders are 
believed to trade on private information and hence outsiders who mimic these trades have an 
opportunity to make abnormal profits. Prior studies provide evidence that buy-and-hold 
trading strategies yield abnormal returns, suggesting that the predictive power of insider 
trades regarding the future stock returns is high. Until recently, insider trades were mostly 
treated homogeneously without distinguishing between the directors who trade and the type 
of trades they make. In this study, in contrast to prior research, we provide a unified 
framework that enables us to analyse simultaneously both the distinction between CEO and 
CFO open market purchases, and whether they trade routinely and opportunistically. In line 
with earlier studies, we consider only purchase transactions as they are more likely to be 
driven by information and predict that routine trades are less likely to be based on private 
information as they are made regularly around the same time during the year. More 
importantly, we investigate the impact of the recent global financial crisis on the relationship 
between insider purchases and subsequent returns. 
We observe that CFOs make more purchases than CEOs; there are more opportunistic 
purchases than routine ones regardless of the specific director and the sub-period; and the 
average value of opportunistic purchases is significantly greater than that for routine 
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purchases. Our empirical analysis reveals that the subsequent market-adjusted returns to 
insider open market purchases are generally positive. Importantly, the findings imply that 
there are no significant differences between opportunistic and routine trades. Nonetheless, the 
results change when we distinguish between the two executives and carry out the analysis for 
different sub-periods. We then find that the opportunistic trades made by both CEOs and 
CFOs are more informative, albeit only in the post-crisis period. Interestingly, the market 
reacts more positively to routine trades made by CEOs in the short term during the crisis 
period. Overall, the strongest results for the positive impact of insider purchases on returns 
relates to the trades made by CEOs in the post-crisis period. We also show that the market-
adjusted returns increase with the size of trade and decrease with greater external affiliations 
of executives and the number of past trades. Our results reveal that board independence 
affects the returns positively during the crisis and negatively in the post-crisis period. 
Taken as a whole, our analysis suggests that the position of the trading director and the 
nature of their trades are important in investigating the impact on returns of insider trades. 
Contrary to the findings of prior research, we find that CEO purchases are on the whole more 
informative than CFO purchases and opportunistic purchases, in particular those made in the 
post-crisis period, have a greater impact on subsequent returns. It seems that the recent 
financial crisis has changed the market’s perception of insider trades regarding their 
informative content. However, we note that our analysis cannot shed light on whether 
insiders have also changed their trading strategies incorporating the shift in the market 
sentiment. This awaits further research. 
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